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An examination of the heuristic capabilities of the self-organized criticality (SOC) theory for studying social processes, reviewing 
key ideas of the theory and the methods of identifying pink noise as an SOC attribute. The authors analyze terrorism in twenty 
countries in the period from 1970s to 2014. The source of the background data is the Global Terrorism Database, maintained by 
the START Consortium. SOC approaches and methodology were used to identify and explain such non-linear effects as spontane-
ous outbreaks of terrorism. It is found that numerical series that reflect changes in the terrorism volume are essentially pink noise. 
This allowed the universal explanatory schemes of SOC theory to be applied to interpret such systems features and dynamics and 
demonstrate that in many countries, terrorism is a self-organized criticality phenomenon. Systems in the state of SOC are capable 
of abrupt growth in activity without any apparent reason. One of the parameters of the numerical series studied ‒ power-law 
exponent ‒can serve as an indicator of the internal state of the societies prone to terror threats. 
 
Keywords: self-organised criticality, pink noise, terrorism1 
 
Acknowledgements:  
This article was based on research work carried out by the SRI FRCEC within its official tasks in the sphere of scientific activity 
(task No. 074-00497-18-00 of the Russian Ministry of Education and Science, project No. 2.12622.2018/12.1). 
 
This study was conducted with financial support from the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (project No. 17-06-00082a, 
"Application of self-organised criticality theory in the study and simulation of social systems and historical processes"). The authors 
are grateful to two anonymous reviewers, whose remarks and advice pointed the way to new meanings in this research. The 
authors would also like to thank START (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), who provided 
us with terrorism activity data. 
 
 
 
@ Natalia Barabash: nsb@extech.ru 
Dmitry Zhukov: ineternum@mail.ru 
01  
IJCV: Vol. 12/2018 
Barabash, Zhukov: Terrorism as a Self-Organised Criticality Phenomenon 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This article aims to identify pink noise in terrorism activities 
in several countries over the past few decades. Since pink 
noise is an attribute of self-organised criticality (SOC), it makes 
SOC-based hypotheses and interpretation possible. The study 
examines numerical series describing the number of terrorism 
events by month in different countries. Our aim is to demon-
strate that SOC theory can be applied to social studies.  
 
1. Approaches 
Bak and collegues (Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld 1988; Bak 
1996) introduced the term “self-organised criticalityˮ to de-
scribe specific patterns in different systems. When a system is 
displaying SOC, then any impulse (even a short, weak and lo-
cal one) will not damp out; instead, it provokes cause-and-
effect chains that span the entire system. The system is overrun 
with numerous reactions and counter-reactions. Thus, a local 
disturbance can have global implications. Thus, a local dis-
turbance can have global implications. The cause and effect 
ratio is no longer commensurate.  
Criticality can appear in systems having specific properties: 
complexity, numerous feedback loops and sensitivity to weak 
perturbation. Bak et al. demonstrated that such systems are 
prone to cause avalanches: abrupt disequilibration and break-
down of key system parameters without apparent cause. SOC 
theory discovers and explains how macroscopic system dy-
namics are connected with numerous microscopic events. It is 
the self-organisation of microscopic processes that causes the 
avalanches (the abrupt transformations) that appear to be 
spontaneous. 
Any system produces numerous signals and noises. A signal 
can be a record of its parameter dynamics in time, or an event 
line it generates. Inside a system displaying SOC, a complex of 
micro- and macroscopic events and their implications cause 
different scale perturbations. This is pink noise (1/f-noise), 
which is an attribute of SOC (Figure 1B). 
SOC theory is a sibling of fractal geometry (Mandelbrot 
1982; Frame and Mandelbrot 2002), and in a way, pink noise 
is a fractal process ‒ a wave making ripples of different size. 
In nature, many systems have been discovered to emit pink 
noise. Pink noise is like the voice of the universe (from fluctu-
ating star luminosity to the electric activity in the human brain). 
The application of SOC theory to social processes is also in-
teresting because it describes non-linear effects: spontaneous 
system activity and disaster mechanisms. Small and large fluc-
tuations in the system are not necessarily provoked by power-
ful external perturbation. They can be caused by macroscopic 
manifestation of microscopic properties of the system. 
Typologically, pink noise approaches white and red (Brown-
ian) noises (Figure 1).  
White noise is a chaotic process. Red noise is a conservative 
process with a strong, though short-term, memory. In this case, 
each following value will depend on the preceding one. Pink 
noise is something in between white and red noises. It is as-
sociated with long-term trends, coexisting with accidental 
events. 
Figure 1: Examples of white (A), pink (B) and red (C) noises 
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Bak defined pink noise in nature as “punctuated equilibriaˮ 
(1996, 29–31, 143): 
Large intermittent bursts have no place in equilibrium systems, 
but are ubiquitous in history, biology, and economics… The com-
plex status is on the border between predictable periodic behav-
ior and unpredictable chaos… Systems with punctuated equilib-
ria combine features of frozen, ordered systems with those of cha-
otic, disordered systems. Systems can remember the past be-
cause of the long periods of stasis allowing them to preserve what 
they have experienced through history, mimicking the behaviour 
of frozen systems. Meanwhile, they can evolve because of inter-
mittent bursts of activity. 
The identification of a process as pink noise warrants a re-
searcher to refer to SOC theory in order to describe the essence 
and dynamics of the system that generated this process.  
 
2. Literature 
Initially, SOC was introduced to explain how nature works 
(Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld 1988; Bak 1996; Sneppen et al. 
1995). But even classical works have admitted the possibility 
of applying this theory to social phenomena.  
Initiatives for adaptation of SOC ideas and methodology by 
cross-disciplinary researchers were brought forward by Turcotte 
(1999; Turcotte and Rundle 2002), Buchanan (2000), Brunk 
(2001, 2002a, 2002b), Borodkin (2005), Kron and Grund 
(2009) and Malinetskii (2013). 
The first studies identify SOC in social processes were dedi-
cated to the history of wars (Roberts and Turcotte 1998; 
Cederman 2003), and strikes and class conflicts (Biggs 
2005). The authors of these papers were able to identify evi-
dence of SOC (such as power-series distribution) and showed 
how social processes could be interpreted through the univer-
sal explanations of SOC theory.  
A more recent work examines social and political conflicts in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Northern Ireland (Picoli et al. 2014). 
Zhukov and his colleagues attempted to study the effects of 
SOC in social processes (2016). Historical data supplied evi-
dence for the hypothesis that changing noise colour is a good 
indicator of the strength, direction and time of transformations 
in the social system in question. Shimada and Koyama (2015) 
also made a valuable contribution with their observations. They 
showed that SOC effects may indicate a system’s potential and 
readiness for social changes. Thietart found SOC effects in a 
large corporation (2016). Tadić et al. (2017) show the SOC 
mechanism in online social dynamics. 
Thus, the possibility and heuristic efficiency of applying SOC 
to the analysis of social phenomena has been described in 
literature. However, despite its major success in the natural 
sciences, SOC theory is still used very little within social studies 
(with the exception of economics). 
 
3. Methodology 
Pink noise can be identified though spectral analysis. Using 
fast Fourier transform, the complex signal is broken down into 
an array of simple harmonics. Each harmonic is reflected by a 
point on a spectrogram (Figure 2); its coordinates represent 
the harmonic frequency and power. 
 
Sometimes (such as in Figure 2), the allocation of 
points/harmonics can clearly reflect a trend ‒ a statistical pat-
tern. The distribution of signal power by frequency can in some 
cases be described with a power function: 
             (1) 
where S is power; f is frequency; v is ratio coefficient; α is 
power-law exponent. α is important for the identification of 
noise type. With α≈2 the noise is considered to be red. If α≈0, 
then there are reasons to believe that it is white noise, although 
Figure 2: An example of a pink noise spectrogram 
 
Note:  Spectrograms are normally portrayed in logarithmic 
space, so the hyperbola looks like a straight line. 
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other techniques are required in order to precisely identify 
white noise. In pink noise, normally α≈1. If the signal in ques-
tion follows power law (1), then α can be calculated from the 
results of spectrum analysis.  
Bak pointed out that in case of pink noise, α can be in the 
range of 0 to 2 (2013, 69). Evidently, when approaching the 
limits of this range, pink noise gradually transforms into white 
or red. 
For the purposes of this study, we used “Spectral (Fourier) 
analysis“ in Statistica with the following settings: pad length to 
power 2: yes; subtract-mean: yes; detrend: yes; data smooth-
ing: no. A standard R2 tool was used to verify the trend and, 
thereby, the value of α. The closer R2 is to 1, the more solidly 
the trend line approximates the points on the spectrogram. 
In our research, R2 declined significantly when α approached 
0. The determination of α does not allow for a positive identi-
fication of white noise. However, when both α and R2 are rather 
low, it is then very likely that the process in question is more 
chaotic than pink or red noise. Also it needs to be mentioned 
that because of the nature of statistical patterns, a moderate 
deviation of R2 from 1 does not mean that the trend line lacks 
representativeness. 
The methodology is explained in more detail in a paper by 
Zhukov et al. (2016). 
 
4. Source Data and Chronological Framework 
Monthly data on terrorism events was sourced from the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (National Consortium 2016). 
This very insightful and reliable database contains information 
about more than 150,000 terror attacks all over the world 
since 1970 to date. The database is maintained by the START 
research centre (The National Consortium for the Study of Ter-
rorism and Responses to Terrorism).  
For the purposes of the study, we selected the countries and 
time periods where terror attacks had occurred over at least six 
months during the year (Table 1). For instance, following this 
criterion, terrorism was not common in Germany in 2000–
2010. 
For cross-temporal comparison of α values, the available nu-
merical series were split periods. 
For most countries, the period before the early 1990s (I) 
should be studied separately from the period from the begin-
ning of the 1990s to date (II). As a rule, sources of terrorism 
activity in the first period were different in the second period. 
Namely, since the 1990s Islamic fundamentalism has become 
a powerful driver of terror, whereas in the previous decades 
terrorism was predominantly a tool used by ethnic/nationalist 
separatists and left-wing radical organisations and move-
ments. The data for 1993 was partially lost in the GTD, so we 
can take 1992 as the late limit of period (I), and 1994 as the 
early limit of period (II).  
Where possible, we devoted special attention to the period 
between 2008 and 2014 (III) in all countries. Unfortunately, 
we could not study the year 2016 (or 2017) separately, be-
cause it is too difficult to interpret the α value in this case.  
Table 1: Size and chronological framework of GTD source 
data 
Country Period 
Number of terror 
attacks 
Algeria 1991–2014 2,721 
Afghanistan 2002–2014 7,613 
United Kingdom 1971–2014 4,919 
Israel 1979–2014 1,988 
India 1983–2014 9,048 
Indonesia 1995–2014 653 
Iraq 2003–2014 15,845 
Spain 1971–2010 3,243 
Colombia 1975–2014 7,954 
Lebanon 1979–2014 2,348 
Nigeria 2006–2014 2,128 
Pakistan 1986–2014 11,490 
Russia 1994–2014 2,060 
United States 1970–2014 2,683 
Turkey 1987–2014 2,548 
Philippines 1978–2014 4,830 
France 1973–2014 2,578 
Germany 1970–1997 1,090 
Sri Lanka 1984–2009 2,924 
South Africa 1979–1996 1,850 
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Time limits of periods (I), (II) and (III) were adjusted for some 
countries (moved within a corresponding time frame) based on 
the specific country and data availability. 
 
5. Results 
Figure 3 shows examples of spectrograms of pink noise (A) 
and signal with near-zero α (B). Both types were identified in 
the terror attack intensity fluctuations in different countries. 
 
 
In Pakistan, R2 is technically far from 1. However, the trend 
is evident on spectrogram B from Figure 3. It is especially con-
clusive in comparison to a rather chaotic configuration of 
points on spectrogram A. This typical example brings hope that 
even mediocre values of R2 will not always render it impossible 
to interpret α. Table 2 shows α values for terrorism intensity 
fluctuations in twenty countries over periods (I), (II) and (III).  
The significant changes in α that coincided with major trans-
formations inside some countries speak in favour of the meth-
odology applied. For instance, we found that α decreased in 
Spain from 0.64 (period I) to 0.17 (period II); and in the United 
Kingdom from 0.7 (period II) to 0.19 (period III). In Spain, by 
the end of the 1990s, the Basque separatists had gradually 
changed from terror to legal actions. Similar processes oc-
curred in Northern Irish separatism in the United Kingdom. Pre-
vious terrorism actors became weak, while the new (Islamism-
based) ones obviously proved not to be very strong. By con-
trast, in Columbia, α rose from 0.35 (period I) to 0.87 (period 
II) with a declining tendency in period (III). Although the stand-
off between the government and left radicals had started in 
Colombia back in the 1970s, it was in the 1990s (early period 
II) when FARC was in its prime. Furthermore, these were also 
the years when the country 
faced organised far-right ter-
rorism. 
To identify the types of ter-
ror activity and group the 
countries by such types, a 
cluster analysis of α values 
for 2008–2014 was con-
ducted (Table 2, penulti-
mate column).  
Results of cluster analysis 
are provided on a tree dia-
gram on Figure 4. It was cre-
ated using the cluster anal-
ysis module in Statistica 
with the following settings: 
clustering method: joining 
(tree clustering); linkage 
rule: weighted pair-group average; distance measure: Euclid-
ean distances. At each step, the algorithm moves two clusters 
together with minimal variability. The linkage distance grows 
with every step (Figure 5). As a rule, this process goes from 
slow to abrupt. The cut-point between slow and rapid growth 
(М on Figures 4 and 5) is normally interpreted as the border-
line between natural and purely artificial clusters. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Terror attack intensity spectrograms 
 
 
А – UK, 2008 – 2014, α=0.19, R2=0.071 
В – Pakistan, 1986 – 2014, α=1.12, R2=0.679 
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At clustering distance М, the system identifies four clusters, 
four of which can be considered as adequate. In India, a low 
α value obviously reflects interference of signals from different 
terrorism sources. The United States is an exceptional and sin-
gle cluster.  
The analytical tools applied are indifferent to factors such as 
a country’s location on the map or income level. However, as 
a result of the analysis we have the United States, France and 
the United Kingdom on one end (Figure 4), and Afghanistan 
and Iraq on the other. This may indicate the ability of these 
procedures to discover some hidden information potential in 
the source numerical series.  
Figure 6 demonstrates country migration between clusters 
(except India), that formed in periods I and III (see Table 2). 
Western countries migrated to clusters with smaller α or 
dropped out due to a lack of statistical data. In period III, one 
can observe the formation of a vast cluster “Lebanon – …– Is-
raelˮ in the zone close to pink noise.  
Table 2: Power-law exponents in spectrograms 
Country 
Period I Period II Period III 
years α R2 years α R2 years α R2 
Algeria – – – 1994-2014 0.77 0.527 2008-2014 0.73 0.485 
Afghanistan – – – 2002-2014 1.17 0.628 2008-2014 1.17 0.656 
United Kingdom 1971-1992 0.67 0.476 1994-2014 0.7 0.480 2008-2014 0.19 0.071 
Israel 1979-1992 0.68 0.491 1994-2014 0.6 0.524 2008-2014 0.63 0.547 
India 1983-1992 0.66 0.636 1994-2014 0.52 0.361 2008-2014 0.41 0.227 
Indonesia – – – 1995-2014 0.25 0.121 2008-2014 0.25 0.142 
Iraq – – – 2003-2014 0.98 0.641 2008-2014 1.23 0.693 
Spain 1971-1992 0.64 0.419 1994-2010 0.17 0.033 – – 
Colombia 1975-1992 0.35 0.123 1994-2014 0.87 0.582 2008-2014 0.73 0.505 
Lebanon 1979-1992 0.77 0.480 1994-2014 0.89 0.519 2008-2014 0.89 0.493 
Nigeria – – – – – – 2008-2014 0.78 0.421 
Pakistan 1986-1992 0.47 0.143 1994-2014 1.08 0.700 2008-2014 0.79 0.554 
Russia – – – 1994-2014 0.56 0.480 2008-2014 0.78 0.554 
United States 1970-1992 0.99 0.580 1994-2014 0.17 0.061 2008-2014 -0.115 0.041 
Turkey – – – 1994-2014 0.63 0.415 2008-2014 0.82 0.427 
Philippines 1978-1992 0.56 0.423 1994-2014 0.91 0.665 2008-2014 0.77 0.732 
France 1973-1992 0.41 0.408 1994-2014 0.5 0.262 2008-2014 0.09 0.006 
Germany 1970-1997 0.36 0.159 – – – – – – 
Sri Lanka 1984-1992 1.11 0.593 1994-2009 0.85 0.641 – – – 
South Africa 1979-1996 0.95 0.642 – – – – – – 
Source data: monthly volume of terrorism events according to GTD. 
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of one of the warring parties. According to Kalyvas (2006), 
Figure 4: Tree diagram with the results of clustering sixteen countries by α value in 2008–2014 
 
Figure 5: Linkage distance/step number correlation 
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in these areas, where the control of the territory by one of the  
Figure 6: α-based clusters in 1970s–1990s (period I) and 2008–2014 (period III) 
 
 
Note: some countries were added (+) or removed (-) following the rise/disappearance of terrorism as system-wide phenom-
enon and/or changes in statistics.  
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6. Interpretation and Hypotheses 
Depending on the colour of the noise in the numerical series 
and based on the explanatory logic of SOC theory, we have 
shown three types of terrorism activity. This typology is not 
based on the level/intensity of terrorism activity. The specific 
reasons and factors producing a rise or decline in terrorism 
may have different implications in different types of social sys-
tems. Therefore, it is important to understand the specific pro-
file of the society and terrorism actors ‒ what they are capable 
or incapable of. 
Low α values are common in the societies where terrorism 
does not have a systemic internal source. In this scenario, ter-
ror outbreaks, even major events, may be caused by short-term 
and locally-limited extraordinary factors and a random combi-
nation of conditions. Also, the transition from high activity to 
low may be abrupt and chaotic. This reflects such societies’ 
openness to external sources of terrorism. The “whiteˮ type 
countries obviously do not have systemic readiness and need 
for grand-scale perturbations. Such “societiesˮ may be targets 
of threats, but long-term terrorism activity is not generated 
from within.  
Furthermore, we can assume that underground terrorist 
groups in such countries are, most likely, an atomised array of 
non- or little-connected actors.  
Red noise is common in the societies going through a terror-
ist war in a hot or latent phase. As in all other types, the inten-
sity of activity in this scenario can be both high and low. But 
the transition from high to low, if any, goes very slowly under 
the influence of some evident and rather strong objective fac-
tors. It means that the system is affected by some determining 
factors, which consistently reproduce the same level of terror 
activities. Such factors can be both generators and depressors 
of activity. In the “redˮ type countries, processes are very firmly 
controlled by the main actors. In this case, underground terror-
ist groups must be tight-knit, well-disciplined and solid. 
The actor generating terrorist activity in pink noise is probably 
a partially controlled system. It has long-term memory and is 
probably capable of strategic planning, but it does not have 
full control over its activity. Pink noise is produced in a system 
where the elements are connected, at least on the information 
level.  
“Pinkˮ societies have inherent system potential for a signifi-
cant rise in the number of terrorism events. Pink noise is an 
indicator of criticality. In this case, random events are accom-
panied by long-term trends and an accumulation of experience 
in the system. Events of any scale can occur in such societies. 
Strong perturbations are caused by ordinary fixed factors in-
herent to the system. It is possible that such factors are not 
even strong or prominent to an observer.  
Such a situation is extremely dangerous for system stability 
because of a high probability of avalanches – major outbreaks 
of terrorism without a long visible preparation period and a 
likely cause. Any reduction in law enforcement may lead to a 
rapid upsurge in terrorism. Moreover, as long as such potential 
inherent to the system exists, no counter-terrorism measures 
can completely end the avalanche effects. Even a long-lasting 
reduction in terrorism activity does not eliminate systemic mi-
croscopic processes that enable macroscopic avalanches.  
We believe that the change in colour is an indicator of trans-
formation in the internal properties of a system that generates 
the process in question. Namely, the transition from a low α 
value to the pink noise is a sign of self-organisation, the system 
being bombarded by all sorts of external impulses and the 
emergence of stable feedback loops.  
The following conclusions can be drawn from Figure 4, which 
shows clusters/types of terrorism activities. In recent years, the 
majority of the studied countries can be classified as the “pinkˮ 
type, with the exception of Western countries such as the 
United States, France, Spain, the United Kingdom and Ger-
many, which are “whiteˮ type. 
The “Israel…Pakistanˮ cluster is described by pink noise with 
a significant share of erratic behaviour. The latter factor, obvi-
ously, does not save the system from large-scale avalanches, 
but to a certain extent can offset the trends that render such 
avalanches inevitable.  
The “Turkey…RSAˮ cluster is dominated by pink noise, which 
makes large-scale outbursts of terrorism in these countries very 
likely. In these cases, terrorism appears to be a self-sustaining 
systemic phenomenon. However, we cannot assert the same 
about RSA and Sri Lanka, because the data used in the anal-
ysis referred to the previous period. 
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The “Afghanistan…Iraqˮ cluster is also “pink”, 
but tending strongly towards “redˮ. In these 
countries, terrorism has essentially become a 
tool of civil war. 
 
7. Counter Examples 
Could the effects of SOC in terrorism be a pro-
jection of self-organised criticality, which is pos-
sibly intrinsic to criminal activities in general? To 
answer this question, let us compare power-law 
exponents of terrorist events with other types of 
crime.  
Annual homicide dynamic was obtained from 
two sources: a study by Fink-Jensen (2015) for 
1940-1999, and the statistics of the United Na-
tions Office On Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for 
2000–2015. UNODC data is available to the 
public (https://data.unodc.org/). But exten-
sive-period data is available just for a few coun-
tries. 
Table 3 displays α and R2 values for the peri-
ods 1940–2015 and 1955–2015. The first pe-
riod includes the Second World War and post-
war years, and the second one excludes those 
years. But the aggregate statistics on both peri-
ods can form a picture on the dynamic of homi-
cides. 
Pink noise can be identified in many series. On 
the microscopic level, societies have inner po-
tential to generate this type of criminal activity. 
However, a group of countries is clearly prone to 
red noise. That includes Italy, France, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, Germany, Hungary, 
Canada, Japan, the United States. For these 
countries, α is within the range from 1.41 to 
2.23. In the “redˮ group, homicide dynamic is 
marginal. 
Table 3: Power-law exponents in spectrograms 
Country 
1940-2015 1955-2015 
α R 2 α R 2 
Iceland -0.13 0.04 0.12 0.02 
Ireland 0.31 0.18 0.36 0.38 
Norway 0.43 0.26 0.34 0.22 
Mauritius 0.62 0.53 0.42 0.46 
Sri Lanka 0.64 0.34 0.62 0.46 
Luxembourg 0.69 0.53 0.70 0.59 
New Zealand 0.69 0.48 0.79 0.71 
Denmark 0.74 0.48 0.77 0.62 
Switzerland 0.85 0.54 0.88 0.63 
Italy 0.97 0.56 1.90 0.92 
Sweden 1.00 0.55 1.02 0.56 
Austria 1.02 0.65 1.00 0.74 
Australia 1.04 0.64 1.24 0.68 
Portugal 1.04 0.78 0.92 0.76 
Netherlands 1.05 0.75 1.24 0.84 
France 1.13 0.56 1.50 0.71 
United Kingdom 1.23 0.77 1.44 0.81 
Turkey 1.29 0.75 0.88 0.82 
Finland 1.31 0.75 0.95 0.68 
Chile 1.32 0.74 0.46 0.38 
Belgium 1.41 0.77 1.17 0.67 
Spain 1.56 0.84 1.45 0.90 
Germany 1.57 0.81 1.69 0.90 
Hungary 1.58 0.72 1.46 0.65 
Canada 1.59 0.76 1.69 0.82 
Japan 1.83 0.79 1.19 0.81 
United States 2.23 0.91 2.21 0.91 
Source data: annual homicide statistics, rate per 100,000 population. 
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This indicates that there are strong factors depressing crimi-
nal activities. Possibly, the civil society or the police state in 
these countries may have control mechanisms strong enough 
to suppress the criminal potential and neutralize sharp surges. 
Table 4 shows that “redˮ group countries have smaller α val-
ues for terrorism compared with homicides. The patterns inher-
ent to homicides are different to those of terrorism. This is es-
pecially true for the United States, where α is very low for ter-
rorism, compared with an extremely high value for homicides. 
For detailed comparison of α values in different types of 
criminal activities, we would need monthly data, which is not 
available to us, with the exception of Russia. The reports of 
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs are available to the public 
(https://mvd.ru/folder/101762). Based on these reports, we 
produced numerical series reflecting the dynamic of acts of 
terror, total crime, extremist crimes, homicides, and theft 
(http://ineternum.ru/bd_extr/). We also analysed the series 
reflecting monthly victims (deaths and casualties) of terrorism 
in Russia (death and casualties). These numbers were sourced 
from the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium 
2016) and RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents 
(RAND 2018).  
Table 4: Comparison of α values for homicides and terrorism in the red group countries 
Country 
Terrorism Homicides 
Period I 1994-2014 2008-2014 1940-2015 1955-2015 
years α R2 α R2 α R2 α R2 α R2 
France 1973-1992 0.41 0.408     0.5 0.262  0.09 0.006 1.13 0.56 1.50 0.71 
Germany 1970-1997 0.36 0.159 – – – – 1.57 0.81 1.69 0.90 
Spain 1971-1992 0.64 0.419 0.17 0.033 – – 1.56 0.84 1.45 0.90 
UK 1971-1992 0.67 0.476 0.70 0.480  0.19 0.071 1.23 0.77 1.44 0.81 
USA 1970-1992 0.99 0.580 0.17 0.061 -0.115 0.041 2.23 0.91 2.21 0.91 
 
Table 5: Power-law exponents in spectrograms 
Data source / data type period α R2 
MIA RF / terrorism crimes  2006-2015 0.64              0.527 
MIA RF / extremist crimes 2006-2015 0.41              0.224 
MIA RF / homicides and attempted homicides 2006-2015 1.04              0.552 
MIA RF / theft 2006-2015 1.23            0.45 
MIA RF / all crimes 2006-2015 1.14              0.518 
GTD / terror attacks 1994-2014 0.56            0.48 
GTD / victims of terror attacks 1994-2014 0.07              0.015 
RAND / terrorism incidents  1998-2008 0.72              0.441 
RAND / victims of terrorism 1998-2008 0.00              0.000 
Source data: monthly numeric series of terrorism, extremist and other crime in Russia. 
Note: MIA RF: Crime in the Russian Federation (Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia); GTD: Global Terrorism Database; RAND: RAND 
Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. 
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The criminal underworld in Russia shows the signs of pink 
noise (see Table 5). However, when it comes to extremist 
crime, the dynamic is significantly more chaotic. In Russia, ex-
tremist crimes are those similar to acts of terror in their mo-
tives, but having less grave repercussions (such as, hooligan-
ism motivated by ethnic hostility). As expected, α values show 
that such crimes are mainly spontaneous.  
α approaches 0 in the series, reflecting the dynamic in vic-
tims of terrorism (Table 3). This outcome could be expected as 
well, since in such crimes, the number of casualties often de-
pends on many random factors and can vary greatly.  
We believe that pink noise in criminal activities is generated 
by intrinsic social parameters, and needs a separate analysis. 
Obviously, terrorism must be connected to the general state of 
the society and, consequently, general state of respective crim-
inal underworld. However, the data at hand does not indicate 
that SOC effects in the numeric series of terrorism are a direct 
and simple reflection, i.e. a particular case, of SOC effects, 
discovered in criminal activities. 
 
8. Conclusion 
We conducted a spectrum analysis of signals reflecting 
changes in terrorism activity in twenty countries over the last 
few decades. A significant share of such signals represents 
pink noise. This allows us to refer to the universal explanatory 
schemes of the SOC theory to interpret the inherent features 
and dynamics of the systems that generate such signals.  
In many countries terrorism is found to be self-organised 
phenomenon, which allows us to formulate certain hypotheses 
about non-linear effects, which manifest themselves in the in-
tensity of terrorism activity.  
In terms of SOC theory and several cognate concepts, micro-
scopic regularities and trivial daily micro-events generate com-
plex macroscopic behaviour, which is described as intermittent 
stability. Abrupt transformations (crisis, revolutions, outbreaks 
of activity) are not necessarily provoked by some strong and 
extraordinary determining factor. Macroscopic perturbations 
may be caused by ordinary, trivial properties of the system and 
a weak external disturbance. Complexity and numerous loop 
relations make the system display criticality and prevent it from 
putting down initial impulses. Criticality is a state of superim-
position of a great multitude of changes of a wide array of 
components.  
Changes in the nature of signals may point at quality 
changes of the corresponding systems. A formal parameter - 
power-law exponent - may serve as a criterion for classifying 
terrorism activity in different countries. 
Such findings give hope that the ideas and methodology of 
SOC theory can be heuristically efficient in social studies. 
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